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I.  INTRODUCTION   
In 2001, the Texas state legislature passed House Bill 1403 (HB 1403) that guaranteed in-
state tuition rates at public universities in Texas for non-citizens who attended a high school in 
the state for three  years.   Since  the Texas  state legislature  passed HB  1403, ten other state 
governments  have  passed  laws  that  extend  in-state  tuition  rates  to  non-citizens  with  similar 
qualifications (Flores, 2010).   The goal of these policies is to improve access to higher education 
to non-citizens who may be unable to pay out-of-state tuition rates at state public universities.  
Since non-citizens do not qualify for federal financial aid and are ineligible for most jobs if 
undocumented, the reduction in the price of higher education that comes from offering in-state 
tuition benefits may be the only source of financial aid that these students receive.  To provide 
some context, the difference between paying in-state tuition rates and out-of-state tuition rates in 
2001 at the Texas state flagship universities was approximately $6,500.
1 
Given the large immigrant population within Texas, it i s perhaps not surprising that it 
was the  first state to pass a law offering in -state tuition benefits to non -citizens.  The legal 
support for the extension of education benefits to non -citizens comes from the Plyer  v. Doe 
(1982) Supreme Court case that led to the expansion of education benefits to non-citizens at the 
elementary and secondary level.  Yet even with the legal support for the provision of educational 
benefits to non-citizens at the primary and secondary education levels,  the extension of in-state 
                                                           
1 The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) provided by the National Center 
for Education Statistics records the cost of attending the University of Texas at Austin in 2000-
2001 for an in-state student were $3,575 while the cost for an out-of-state student were $10,025.  
The comparable numbers for Texas A&M University were $3,374 for an in-state student and 
$9,824 for an out-of-state student.         2 
 
tuition rates to non-citizens in public higher education has remained controversial.  One of the 
reasons why there is debate over whether non-citizens can be charged in-state tuition rates is due 
to  the  federal  guidelines  provided  in  the  1996  Illegal  Immigration  Reform  and  Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).  According to IIRIRA, non-citizens cannot be given preferential 
treatment relative to citizens.  Opponents of in-state tuition benefits for non-citizens argue that 
by  charging  them  a  lower  price  than  citizens  from  other  states  that  these  non-citizens  are 
receiving preferential treatment (e.g. Kobach, 2006-2007).  Lawsuits, such as Day v. Sebelius, 
have been filed on behalf of out-of-state citizens under the claim that charging them out-of-state 
tuition rates and non-citizens in-state tuition rates violates IIRIRA (Feder, 2006).  Proponents of 
the legislation point out that the legal requirements for a non-citizen to obtain in-state tuition are 
more stringent than the legal requirements for a citizen who moves to Texas (e.g. Olivas 2004).  
With this reasoning, non-citizens are not receiving preferential treatment but rather are facing 
more scrutiny.
2  As evidence of the controversy over the provision of in -state tuition rates, the 
state government of Oklahoma both passed and repealed the law that offered in-state tuition rates 
to non-citizens (Flores, 2010).   
                                                           
2 The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board provides information on in-state tuition rates 
and this document describes why non-citizens are not treated preferentially to citizens.  The 




Researchers for several decades have sought to evaluate the effects of college costs on 
educational attainment.
3   Due to the endogeneity of college costs, it is often difficult to credibly 
identify the effects of college costs on enrollment .  Only a few studies focus  on the effects of 
offering in-state tuition rates on enrollment.   Bridget Long (2004) provides an analysis of how 
in-state tuition rates affect where students choose to attend college.  She finds that if the students 
were offered grants  rather than in-state tuition at the state public universities  that many more 
students would choose a private unive rsity.   Recently, a few studies have employed a quasi -
experimental design to identify  how extending in-state tuition rates to previously ineligible 
groups of students affects college enrollment rates.   Abraham and Clark (2006) provides an 
analysis of the District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Grant (DCTAG) program that offers in-
state tuition benefits at all public univer sities to students who graduate  from high schools in 
Washington, D.C.   Abraham and Clark (2006) find the program increases  college enrollment 
rates.  Flores (2010) and Kaushal (2008) use the CPS and difference-in-differences estimation to 
analyze how the introduction of in-state tuition benefits affect college attendance rates of Latinos 
and Mexicans, respectively.  Both studies report pos itive and statistically significant effects.  
Chin and Juhn (2010) analyze the effects using a similar identification strategy and data from the 
American Community survey but find no significant effects.   
This study focuses on the effects of offering in -state tuition for non -citizens on the 
enrollment yields of non-citizens at six universities in Texas.  The enrollment yield is the fraction 
of students who choose to enroll at the university conditional upon being admitted to the 
                                                           
3 Leslie and Brinkman (1988) provide a review of the early literature.  Cellini (2008) provides a 
review of the recent literature and emphasizes the current techniques used to identify the causal 
effects of college costs on college enrollment.   4 
 
university.  Van der Klaauw (2002) and Linsenmeier, Rosen and Rouse (2006) provide recent 
examples of studies that analyze the effects of lower costs on enrollment yields.  Five of the 
universities in this study (Texas A&M, University of Texas at Austin, University of Texas at Pan 
American,  University  of  Texas  at  San  Antonio  and  Texas  Tech  University)  are  public  and 
therefore extended in-state tuition benefits to non-citizens after the implementation of HB 1403.  
The sixth university, Southern Methodist University (SMU), is a private university.  The policy 
change did not directly affect the university's tuition policy for non-citizens.  However, due to 
the decrease in price at the public universities for non-citizens, the relative price of SMU for 
non-citizens increased after the policy change.  Due to the “natural experiment” of the passage of 
HB  1403,  we  measure  the  effects  of  the  policy  using  difference-in-difference  techniques.  
Explicitly, we compare the difference in the enrollment yields of non-citizens before and after 
the policy to the difference in enrollment yields of citizens before and after the policy.  Citizens 
who were residents of Texas serve as a control group as they were already eligible for the in-
state tuition rates prior to the passage of HB 1403.   
This  study  provides  several  contributions  to  the  growing  literature  on  the  effects  of 
college costs on college enrollment.  Previous studies of in-state tuition rates have focused on the 
whether the policy affects the educational attainment of Hispanics and have found mixed results 
with Chin and Juhn (2010) finding no significant effects and Kaushal (2008) and Flores (2010) 
finding  significant  effects.    None  of  the  previous  studies  analyzed  the  effects  at  specific 
universities and therefore left many questions unanswered.  Among the unanswered questions 
are:  1) Does  the policy affect  enrollment at  four-year universities?  Since many  immigrants 
choose to attend two-year colleges, there is some question as to how large the effect is at four-
year  universities.  2)    Are  the  effects  uniform  across  universities?    Does  the  policy  affect 5 
 
enrollment only at the state flagship universities?  Does the effect vary according to university 
selectivity?  3)  Does the policy lead to a shift away from private universities?   As Bridget Long 
(2004) demonstrates in her study, in-state tuition can lead to students substituting away from 
private universities.  The answers to these questions are relevant and important to policymakers 
who are concerned about the educational attainment of non-citizens as well as to policymakers 
who are considering legislation on immigration and educational benefits.   While the states seem 
to be leading the way on passing in-state tuition benefits for non-citizens, there is a national 
policy, the DREAM act, which has also been considered by the US Congress that would also 
provide educational benefits to non-citizens.
4   
In  addition  to  the  contribution  to  the literature  on  the  effects  of  college  costs  on 
enrollment, this study also compares the estimated effects of the policy using both a  linear and 
nonlinear model.   The dependent variable in the analysis is the binary variable for whether an 
individual chooses to enroll in the university or not.   As mentioned in Ai and Norton (2003), the 
difference-in-difference estimation technique was used in 72 published studies with a binary 
dependent variable and in all of the published studies the estimated effect was miscalculated.  In 
order to circumvent the time costs of correctly evaluating marginal effects in nonlinear models or 
perhaps for ease of interpretation, some authors choose to present only estimates from linear 
models (e.g. Borjas, 2003; Dynarski, 2000, 2003).  This study provides both the estimates of the 
effects of the policy using a linear model and the appropriate marginal effect from a  nonlinear 
model in order to evaluate whether the regression technique affects the interpretation of the 
effects of the policy.  By providing both estimates, this study can demonstrate whether policy 
analysis is affected by the regression technique.    
                                                           
4 Olivas (2010) provides a political analysis of the DREAM Act.   6 
 
 
II.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A large literature currently investigates the theoretical reasons why an individual should 
invest  in  a  college  education.    According  to  Becker  (1962),  individuals  should  invest  in 
education if the present discounted value of the benefits of a college education outweigh the 
present discounted value of the costs of a college education.  Within this theoretical framework, 
two of the reasons why an individual may choose not to invest in a college education are: 1) the 
benefits to a college education are less than the costs of a college education or 2) the individual 
faces credit constraints that prevent them from financing the initial costs of a college education.  
Non-citizens may be more likely to choose not to invest in a college education due to both of 
these reasons.  Non-citizens, if undocumented, receive very little benefits to a college degree 
unless they plan to work outside of the United States.   Non-citizens are also more likely to come 
from families of very low income and thus may not be able to finance the temporary costs of a 
college education. Therefore, the effects of lowering college costs for non-citizens on enrollment 
may be lower than that for citizens.    
This study focuses on the effects of lowering college costs on the enrollment yields of 
non-citizens.    As  discussed  in  Manski  and  Wise  (1983)  and  mentioned  in  Van  der  Klaauw 
(2002), the decision to matriculate in college is actually the result of several steps.  Individuals 
must first apply to college and be accepted to college.  After being accepted to college, the 
students (if they did not apply early decision) are usually notified of their financial aid and then 7 
 
must decide whether to enroll at that particular college.
5   This study focuses on the last decision 
of non-citizens to choose to enroll at a specific university after being accepted to that university.  
Unlike citizens, non-citizens are not eligible for  federal  financial aid (work-study programs, 
loans, or grants).  Therefore, their decision is mainly based on the listed tuition for each 
university and the change from out-of-state tuition to in-state tuition represents a large reduction 
in costs.    
 In theory, the individual should decide to enroll at a spec ific university if the expected 
utility from attending that university is higher than the alternatives.   Let's assume that the 
expected utility from attending university j for a non-citizen is equal to:  
                                                              
where p is the probability the student graduates from the university, G is the earnings if they 
graduate from the university, F is the earnings if they fail out of the university, and for simplicity 
let's assume that the tuition costs the same and is currently equal to the out-of-state tuition rates.   
The alternatives could be either attending another university or choosing to attend no university.  
For now, let's assume that the utility from choosing the best alternative is equal to           .  
  The  individual  will  rationally  choose  to  enroll  at  college  j  if  the  expected  utility  of 
college j is higher than the utility from the best alternative.    
                                    
                                    
                                                           
5 Students who apply early decision are often bound to attend the university if accepted.   They 
usually are not made aware of their financial aid offers prior to having to decide whether to 
attend the university.   8 
 
In  this  study,  we  compare  the  enrollment  yields  of  non-citizens  before  and  after  the 
implementation of HB 1403.   After the implementation of HB 1403, the tuition costs fell by 
approximately $6500.   The reduction in tuition costs should increase the expected utility of 
attending the public universities.  If the utility of the alternatives has remained constant, then the 
yield  rates of the universities  who lowered tuition  rates for non-citizens  should demonstrate 
increased yield rates.  One exception would be if the student was considering a public university 
and the best alternative was also a public university.  In this case, both universities would have 
reduced  tuition  by  approximately  the  same  amount  and  the  enrollment  probability  between 
enrolling at university j and the best alternative would have been unchanged.       
  In this study, we will be evaluating the effects of the policy by comparing the yield rates 
of non-citizens before and after the policy to the yield rates of citizens before and after the 
policy.  Since the policy change did not affect citizens, the difference in the yield rates of citizens 
can be used to control for other factors that may have affected the desirability of universities over 
time.  The underlying causal identification of the policy relies on assumption is that absent the c 
change in the policy no other factors would cause the enrollment yields of citizens and non-
citizens to diverge.   
 
III.   DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
  The Texas Higher Education Opportunity Project (THEOP) collected administrative data 
from several universities in Texas.
6  This study uses data from six of these universities: Texas 
                                                           
6 The THEOP project was led by Marta Tienda and Teresa Sullivan.  A description of the 
project, data, and research papers are available from the Texas Higher Education Opportunity 
Project website: http://theop.princeton.edu/  While the study originally collected data from nine 9 
 
A&M, UT-Austin, UT-Pan American, UT-San Antonio, Texas Tech University and Southern 
Methodist University (SMU).  For each of the universities, the administrative records include 
detailed  information  on  applicants'  demographic  characteristics  and  academic  qualifications.  
Due to the enormous changes in college admissions in the 1990s in Texas, this study only uses 
data  after 1998 (see  Card and Krueger, 2005;  Dickson,  2006a, 2006b;  Domina, 2007;  Long 
2004a, 2004b).  For all years used in this study, the top ten percent rule is in place (see Long and 
Tienda,  2008).  Given  that  we  are  interested  in  comparing  students  who  are  similar  in 
background,  we  focus  only  on  students  who  possibly  meet  the  required  in-state  tuition 
requirements  and only  on students  who are considering  enrollment  during the fall semester.  
Students who may meet the in-state tuition requirements are either students recorded as being 
Texas residents or students who report that they graduated from a Texas high school.    
Since we are interested in the effects of the policy on the enrollment yield of students, we 
present the characteristics of all of the accepted applicants at each of the universities in Table 1.  
The  first  noticeable  difference  between  the  universities  is  the  difference  in  the  average 
enrollment  yield.      For  the  state  flagship  universities  (UT-Austin  and  Texas  A&M),  the 
enrollment yield is higher than 60 percent.  At the remaining universities, the enrollment yields 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
universities only six of the universities could be used in this analysis.  Three of the universities 
did not record information on the citizenship status of the student and thus were dropped from 
the analysis.  One of the main reasons for the collection of the data was to study the effects of 
ending affirmative action on college admissions.  However, due to the time period that the data 
was collected it is also possible to evaluate the effects of offering in-state tuition on the 
enrollment yields of non-citizens. 
 10 
 
are lower.   SMU, the one private university in the sample, has the lowest enrollment yield at 
approximately 37.5 percent over the time period of interest.   At each of the universities, the 
fraction of non-citizens who may qualify for in-state tuition is very small.  This is consistent with 
the information available from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board.
7   The fraction 
of non-citizens who  are either Texas residents or graduated from a Texas high school  ranges 
from less than 1 percent at UT -Austin to 4 percent at UT-San Antonio.   The policy variable 
shows the fraction of the sample that was admitted after HB 1403  was passed.   The interaction 
between non-citizen in-state and policy provides the share of students affected by the policy as a 
fraction of the entire applicant pool over the time period.  The respective shares range from half a 
percent at UT-Austin to 3 percent at UT-San Antonio.    
The demographic characteristics of the admitted students also vary considerably across 
universities.  Noticeably, the share of male students admitted is less than half at all of the 
universities except for Texas Tech.  This is in accordance with national trends  as discussed in 
Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006).  Notably, blacks and Hispanics make up a small fraction of 
admitted students at the state flagship universities.  However, for two of the universities in the 
sample (UT-Pan American and UT-San Antonio), Hispanics constitute the majority of admitted 
students.  At UT-Pan American, Hispanics  include more than three quarters of the admitted 
students.  At UT-San Antonio, Hispanics are approximately half of all admitted students.  At 
                                                           
7 The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board provides information on in-state tuition rates 
and this document estimates that eight/tenths of one percent of all students enrolled in higher 




most of the universities, the share of students who are Texas residents makes up over 95 percent 
of the sample.  For the remaining portion of the sample, the students who did not report being a 
Texas resident had to report that they graduated from a Texas high school.    
The academic qualifications of the students vary considerably by the university as well.  
The state flagship universities report the highest SAT scores.   More than half of the admitted 
students at the state flagship universities are in the top decile of their high school class.  The 
average class ranks of students at the remaining universities are considerably lower.   UT-Pan 
American appears to be the least selective in admissions as students admitted at this university 
report the lowest class ranks and the lowest SAT scores.  Students from feeder high schools 
make up almost 20 percent of admitted students at Texas A&M and Texas Tech.   At UT-Austin, 
students from feeder high schools constitutes approximately 24 percent of the admitted students.  
Students from private high schools make up a large proportion of admitted students at SMU, a 
private university.   
  An evaluation of the effects of HB 1403 on the enrollment yields of non-citizens requires 
identification of students who may potentially be eligible for the policy.  The requirements of the 
law are that individuals must have graduated from a Texas high school and have resided in the 
state for at least three years.  Unfortunately, these administrative data from the universities do 
not include information on the time the student lived in Texas.   Due to this problem, we are only 
able to identify the possible treatment group by whether they 1) are identified as a Texas resident 
or 2) reported graduating from a high school in Texas.  Since we can not perfectly capture and 
potentially over-estimate the treatment group , our estimates of the effects of the policy may be 
downwardly biased.   12 
 
  In this study, we exploit the natural experiment of HB 1403 to identify the effects of 
lowering tuition costs on the enrollment probabilities of non-citizens.  Since citizens who were 
residents of the state already qualified for in-state tuition rates at public universities, they can be 
used to control for other factors that may affect enrollment probabilities.  We identify the effect 
of the policy by constructing a double-difference where the first difference is the difference in 
the enrollment probabilities of non-citizens after the policy and before the policy.  The second 
difference subtracts off the difference in the enrollment probabilities of citizens after the policy 
and before the policy for citizens.   This is shown in the following equation:  
                                                                                              (1)  
where NC denotes non-citizen and C denotes citizen.  This double difference can be calculated 
using the means for the probabilities of enrollment at each of the universities.    
  Table  2  shows  the  enrollment  probabilities  of  non-citizens  and  citizens  prior  to  the 
implementation of HB 1403 and after the implementation of HB1403 for each of the universities.  
The table presents evidence on how the enrollment yields of non-citizens and citizens changed 
after the policy and provides t-tests to identify whether the changes were statistically significant.  
In addition, the table presents the mean difference in enrollment yields between non-citizens and 
citizens for each of the time periods.  For all of the time periods at all of the public universities, 
non-citizens  demonstrate  lower  enrollment  yields  than  do  citizens.    At  SMU,  prior  to  the 
implementation of the policy, the enrollment yield of non-citizens was higher than the enrollment 
yield of citizens.  For each of the universities, we calculate the double-difference.  The means 
show  that  at  only  one  public  university,  UT-Pan  American,  did  the  policy  increase  the 
probability of enrollment.  The means show a 11.8 percent increase in enrollment due to the 
policy for non-citizens after subtracting the positive trend in enrollment exhibited by citizens.  At 13 
 
Texas A&M, the enrollment yields of non-citizens fell by more than the enrollment yields of 
citizens.  This led to an estimated double-difference that is negative and marginally significant.   
At SMU, the means show that the policy led to a large reduction in the probability of enrollment 
for non-citizens.  The double-difference at SMU indicates a 23.6 percentage point decrease in the 
probability of enrollment.     
  The difference in the mean probabilities of enrollment does not separate the effects of 
individual characteristics from the effects of the policy change.  It may be that the characteristics 
of the accepted students changed over the time period which may lead to differences in the 
probabilities  of  enrollment.    In  order  to  capture  this,  we  estimate  the  following  regression 
separately for each of the six universities:  
                                                                          
                                                           (2) 
The dependent variable in the regression is whether the student chooses to enroll at the university 
given that the student is already accepted.  NC is an indicator for whether the student is a non-
citizen. Policy is an indicator for whether the in-state tuition policy for non-citizens is in effect.  
The main coefficient of interest in the regression is    which is our estimate of the effect of the 
double-difference.  Demographics is a vector of indicator variables for the applicant's race and 
ethnicity.   SAT denotes the applicant's SAT score.  If the student took the ACT, the ACT score 
was translated into the appropriate SAT score.  The class rank for the student is controlled for 
using both the student's reported class rank and an indicator for whether the student graduated in 
the top ten percent of their high school class.
8  The indicator for individuals in the top ten percent 
                                                           
8 For those students that had a missing class rank, the missing value is imputed using the mean 
class rank by gender, year, and university.   A missing indicator is then included in the regression 14 
 
of their high school class is used to account for any nonlinearities in the effect of class rank on 
the probability of enrollment that may be due to the top ten percent rule.
9  Since this policy may 
also affect enrollment probabilities, the indicator for top ten percent students is included in the 
regression analysis.  The high school characteristics included in the regression are: an indicator 
for whether the high school sends a disproportionate number of students to the state flagships 
and is called a feeder school in the data and an indicator for whether the high school the student 
attended was private.      
  Since the dependent variable in the regression is binary, there are some options as to the 
estimation method used to evaluate the effects of the policy.  The potential problem with this 
type of model is that this model can lead to predictions outside of the 0 to 1 interval and leads to 
errors that are heteroskedastic.  However, the coefficients from the linear probability model are 
easy to interpret.   With a linear model, the estimate of the policy is simply the coefficient     
which is constrained to be the same for all individuals.  Another method that could be employed 
to estimate the model is a probit regression.  The advantages of the probit regression are that the 
predictions lie within the 0 to 1 interval and that the estimated marginal effect of the policy can 
vary  across  individuals.    The  disadvantage  of  the  probit  regression  is  that  the  appropriate 
marginal  effect  is  difficult  to  calculate.  According  to  Ai  and  Norton  (2003)  72  authors  in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
analysis.  This is the same technique used by Long and Tienda (2008) who also used the THEOP 
data.   
9 The top ten percent rule guarantees students in the top ten percent of their graduating high 
school class in Texas admission to the public university of their choice (see Dickson 2004a, 
Long 2004b).     15 
 
published studies inaccurately calculated the marginal effect.  Due to the difficulty of calculating 
the  appropriate  marginal  effect  in  nonlinear  models,  the  ordinary  least  squares  method  of 
estimating differences-in-differences has become more common despite its' known shortcomings 
(e.g. Borjas, 2003; Dynarski, 2003).
10  This study provides a comparison between the estimates 
obtained from ordinary least squares and the estimates obtained from the probit regression to see 
whether the differences in estimation technique affect s the interpretation of the effects of the 
policy.   
 
IV.  RESULTS 
The results from ordinary least squares regression for each of the universities is provided 
in Table 3.  The regression results are substantially different from the means presented in Table 
2.    Notably,  after  controlling  for  individual  characteristics  and  academic  preparation,  non-
citizens are significantly more likely to enroll at UT-Austin, UT-Pan American and SMU.  The 
effect  is  very  large  with  non-citizens  being  41  percentage  points  more  likely  to  enroll  than 
citizens at UT-Austin.  The effect is smaller at UT-Pan American and SMU at approximately 14 
percentage points at both universities.  For most of the universities, the enrollment yields fell 
significantly following the implementation of HB 1403 controlling for individual characteristics.  
The results are statistically significant at each university except for UT-Pan American.   The 
effect  ranges  from  an  increase  of  2.3  percentage  points  at  UT-Austin  to  a  decrease  of  6.2 
percentage points at UT-San Antonio.    
Table  3  suggest  that  the  policy  significantly  affected  enrollment  at  three  of  the  six 
universities: UT-San Antonio, UT- Pan American, and SMU.  The coefficient on the interaction 
                                                           
10 Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) provide a description and example of how to calculate the appropriate marginal 
effects for interaction terms in nonlinear models.   16 
 
between non-citizen and the in-state tuition policy is marginally significant (at the 10% level) at 
UT-San Antonio and the magnitude suggests the policy led to a 5 percentage point increase in 
the probability of enrollment for non-citizens.  The difference in tuition levels for in-state and 
out-of-state students at UT-San Antonio in 2000-2001 was $5,160.  This suggests that for every 
$1,000 in aid the enrollment probability increased by 1 percentage point.  The magnitude of the 
effect  at  UT-  Pan  American  is  substantially  larger  suggesting  that  the  policy  led  to  an  18 
percentage  point  increase  in  the  probability  of  enrollment  for  non-citizens.      For  UT-Pan 
American, this estimate is significant at the 1% level.  The difference in tuition levels for in-state 
and out-of-state students at UT-Pan American in 2000-2001 was approximately $6,000.  This 
suggests that a $1,000 decrease in costs leads to a 3 percentage point increase in the probability 
of enrollment.  This is similar to the magnitude recorded in Dynarski for overall enrollment 
effects (2000, 2003).  The effect of the policy for Southern Methodist University is a decrease in 
the probability of enrollment for non-citizens of approximately 18 percentage points and this is 
significant at the 5% level.  At the remaining universities, the estimated effect of the policy, the 
double-difference, is statistically insignificant.   
The results from the ordinary least squares regression suggest that the policy did not 
increase the probability of enrollment at all universities.   Rather the positive effects of the policy 
seem to be concentrated at universities that historically enrolled a large percentage of Hispanic 
students.      This  is  interesting  as  the  policy  did  not  significantly  increase  the  probability  of 
enrollment at the most selective public universities.   It may be that this is due to the small 
percentage  of  non-citizens  accepted  at  these  universities.  The  negative  effect  at  SMU  is 
suggestive that the policy possibly led to substitutions between public and private universities.    17 
 
The signs on the remaining coefficients are also of interest.  It appears that at the state 
flagship universities both African-Americans and Hispanics are less likely to enroll conditional 
on  being  accepted  than  are  white  students.      For  all  of  the  universities  except  for  UT-San 
Antonio, the higher a student's SAT score, the less likely they are to enroll at that particular 
university.  This suggests possibly that these students had other options outside of the current 
school  being  considered.  Students  who  declared  that  they  were  Texas  residents  were 
significantly more likely to enroll at each of the universities than were students who had only 
graduated from a Texas high school.   
For each of the regressions, we also calculated the percent of predictions that lie outside 
of  the  0  to  1  range.    The  predicted  probabilities  can  be  calculated  by  multiplying  the 
characteristics of each student by the coefficients provided by the regression results.   As a 
probability can only possibly lie between 0 and 1, it is troubling if there are predictions outside 
of the 0 to 1 range.  Notably, with this particular model across universities very few observations 
lie  outside  the  0  to  1  range.    The  last  line  of  table  3  provides  the  fraction  of  predicted 
probabilities outside of the 0 to 1 range.  The largest number of values outside of the 0 to 1 range 
is for UT-Pan American with 2.9% of the sample.  The smallest values are for UT-San Antonio 
and Texas Tech with 0 predicted values outside of the 0 to 1 range.     
The effects of the policy are also calculated using a probit regression.  The advantages of 
the probit regression are that the model does not lead to predictions outside of the 0 to 1 range.  
Also, another advantage is that the marginal effect of the policy can vary by individuals.   It may 
be  that  the  policy  has  very  little  effect  on  students  who  already  have  a  high  probability  of 
enrolling.  It may also have little effect on students who have a very low probability of enrolling.  
The largest effects may be on those that are unsure as to whether to enroll.  By estimating the 18 
 
model  with  a  probit  regression,  the  marginal  effect  of  the  policy  varies  according  to  the 
characteristics  of  the  student.  Table  4  provides  the  average  of  the  marginal  effects  for  the 
double-difference for each individual for each university and the relative z-statistic.     
When estimating a probit regression, the estimated effects of the policy suggest a positive 
and significant impact on the enrollment probability at UT-Pan American and UT-San Antonio.  
Noticeably, the estimated effects are smaller at UT-Pan American with the probit specification 
when  compared  to  the  linear  specification.      The  estimated  effect  according  to  the  probit 
regression suggests that the policy increased the probability of enrollment by approximately 14 
percentage  points.      The  comparable  number  from  the  linear  model  is  that  it  increased  the 
probability of enrollment by 18 percentage points.  However, it appears that the estimates are 
both within the standard error of one another.  At UT-San Antonio, the estimated effect of the 
policy is that it increases the probability of enrollment by 5.6 percentage points.  This estimate is 
very similar to the estimate obtained from the linear model and is again marginally significant at 
the 10 percent level.  The effects at SMU are different from the probit model when compared to 
the  estimated  effects  from  the  linear  model.  First,  it  appears  that  the  results  are  no  longer 
statistically significant in the probit regression.   The magnitude of the effect is also considerably 
smaller at an estimated 6.9 percentage points rather than an 18 percentage point decrease.  The 
remaining estimates for the universities are statistically insignificant.  Again, suggesting that the 
policy did not significantly affect the probability of enrollment at the state flagship universities. 
 
V.   ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Comparison of non-citizen Hispanics to citizen Hispanics 19 
 
The only two previous studies on the effects of in-state tuition rates on the educational 
attainment of non-citizens have focused exclusively on Hispanics.
11  The focus on this group of 
individuals is due to the fact that the majority of undocumented citizens within the United States 
are Hispanics.   While limiting the sample to these individuals does allow for homogeneity of the 
population, there is a tradeoff as there are still some individuals (namely Asians, Africans) who 
are also affected by the policy that are not  included.   In order to provide some comparison, we 
also conduct an analysis of the effects of the policy only on Hispanics.   This may also be of 
interest as our previous results demonstrated that the largest policy effects were at UT -San 
Antonio and UT-Pan American, universities that enroll a large number of Hispanic students.   
Table 5 provides the average characteristics of the subsample of individuals who are 
Hispanic.  The limitation to only Hispanics severely limits the sample and eliminates the 
possibility of studying UT-Austin as no non-citizen Hispanic students  are admitted during the 
available time period.   Some other noticeable differences occur when comparing the limited 
sample of Hispanics (Table 5) to the previous sample of all individuals (Table 1).  Within the 
Hispanic subsample, more than half of the admitted Hispanic students choose to enroll at Texas 
A&M, UT-Austin, UT-Pan American, and UT-San Antonio.  Noticeably, the yield rate is lower 
for the Hispanic subsample of admitted students at  Texas A&M, UT-Austin, UT-San Antonio, 
and Texas Tech than it is for the entire sample of admitted individuals.  Interestingly, the yield 
rate is actually higher for the Hispanic subsample of admitted students at UT-Pan American and 
SMU than it is for the whole universe of admitted students.   Approximately half of all admitted 
Hispanic students at UT-Pan American choose to enroll and this can be compared to a yield rate 
of  44  percent  for  the  entire  sample  of  admitted  students.      At  SMU,  the  yield  rate  is 
                                                           
11 Flores (2010) focuses on all Latinos.  Kaushal (2008) focuses on Mexicans.   20 
 
approximately 2 percentage points higher in the Hispanic subsample than it is for the universe of 
all admitted students.  Other noticeable differences between the Hispanic subsample of admitted 
students and the universe of all admitted students is the difference in the proportion of students in 
the top decile of their high school class.  At Texas A&M, 58 percent of admitted Hispanics are in 
the top decile this can be compared to only half of all admitted students in the full sample.  At 
UT-Austin, almost 70 percent of Hispanic students are in the top decile and this can be compared 
to 59 percent of all admitted students.  Noticeably, the share of admitted Hispanics at feeder high 
schools and private high schools are considerably smaller than  for the share of all admitted 
students at these universities.   
Table 6 provides the estimated coefficients from estimating equation 2 for the Hispanic 
subsample.  The results show that non-citizens were significantly more likely to enroll at UT-San 
Antonio than citizens controlling for all else.  The main coefficient of interest is the estimated 
double-difference which is the coefficient on the interaction between non-citizen and policy.  
Within the Hispanic subsample, the double-difference is only statistically significant at UT-Pan 
American.   The estimate at UT-Pan American indicates that the policy led to an increase in the 
probability of enrollment by 15.5 percentage points for Hispanic non-citizens.  For the remaining 
universities, the estimated effect is statistically insignificant.  For three of the universities (Texas 
A&M, UT-Pan American, and SMU), a higher SAT score suggests a decrease in the probability 
of enrollment.  This is suggestive again that these students may have other options than do 
students  with  lower  SAT  scores.    Students  who  reported  being  a  resident  of  Texas  were 
significantly more likely to enroll at Texas A&M, UT-San Antonio,  and UT-Pan American.  
Noticeably, these students were significantly less likely to enroll at SMU.  This may be due to 21 
 
the  relatively  high  tuition  rates  at  SMU  when  compared  to  the  in-state  rates  at  the  public 
universities.   
Table 7 shows the estimated average of the marginal effects for the Hispanic sample for 
each of the universities.  With the probit regression, the average of the marginal effects for the 
individuals suggests that the policy led to approximately a 19 percentage point increase in the 
probability of enrollment at UT-Pan American.   However, in this subsample the estimated effect 
is statistically insignificant.  Once again, the estimated effect of the policy on the enrollment 
yield at SMU is statistically insignificant in the probit regression.  With the probit specification, 
there is a substantial negative effect of the policy on the enrollment probability at Texas Tech 
University.  The estimated average marginal effect at this university is almost 20 percentage 
points and it is marginally significant.  Once again, the ordinary least squares estimates do differ 
in notable ways from the marginal effects found from a probit model.   
   
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The extension of in-state tuition rates to non-citizens increases the probability of non-
citizens  enrolling  in  college.    It  appears  that  this  policy  had  a  significant  impact  on  the 
probability of enrollment at public universities that already enrolled a large number of Hispanics.  
However, the policy had an insignificant impact on the probability of enrollment at the state 
flagship universities.  This suggests that the reduction in costs was not enough to persuade non-
citizens  to  enroll  at  the  state  flagship  universities.    The  results  from  a  linear  specification 
suggested  that  the  policy  may  have  had  unintended  consequences  on  the  higher  education 
market.    There  is  some  suggestive  evidence  that  the  policy  decreased  the  probability  of 
enrollment at private universities.   This may be due to students substituting public universities 22 
 
for private universities.   As mentioned by Bridget Long (2004), in-kind benefits such as in-state 
tuition rates may have unintended and undesired effects on the market for higher education.  In 
particular, it may lead to inefficient matches between students and colleges.  
  In this study, we also provided a comparison between linear and nonlinear methods of 
estimation.    Due  to  the  complexity  of  calculating  and  interpreting  the  appropriate  marginal 
effects in nonlinear models, the use of nonlinear models has become less common.   This study 
demonstrates that the method of estimation does appear to affect the estimated effects of the 
policy.  The  estimated  coefficients  from  a  linear  model  are  easier  to  interpret  than  the 
coefficients  from  nonlinear  models  especially  when  the  model  includes  interaction  terms.  
However, the linear model does impose some constraints on the estimated effect of the policy.  
In the specification most commonly used in double-difference estimation, the estimate of the 
policy is constrained to be constant across individuals in a linear model.  This may not be an 
accurate assumption in this circumstance.  The policy may be more likely to affect individuals 
who are on the border between enrolling and not enrolling and very little effect on individuals 
who have already made up their minds whether to enroll or not enroll.  The nonlinear model 
allows for the effect of the policy to vary according to the individual characteristics.   When 
allowing the effect to vary across individuals, the significant negative effect on the probability of 
enrollment at SMU disappears.  However, the significant positive effect at UT-San Antonio and 
UT-Pan American remains.  With the full sample, however, the demonstrated effects of the 
policy on enrollment at UT-Pan American and UT-San Antonio are similar regardless of the 
regression technique.  Notably, the largest effects are for UT-Pan American a university located 
close to the border of Mexico.   23 
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Table 1:  Accepted Student Characteristics by University 






Texas Tech  SMU 
Enroll = 1  0.624  0.616  0.440  0.543  0.458  0.375 
Policy Variables             
Non-citizen in-state  0.022  0.007  0.025  0.040  0.016  0.015 
Policy  0.414  0.488  0.427  0.696  0.609  0.734 
Non-citizen in-state 
* Policy 
0.010  0.005  0.012  0.030  0.011  0.009 
Demographic 
Characteristics 
           
Male  0.477  0.465  0.451  0.440  0.545  0.392 
Black  0.033  0.041  0.016  0.063  0.036  0.061 
Hispanic  0.110  0.154  0.762  0.491  0.114  0.100 
American Indian  0.005  0.004  0.001  0.005  0.005  0.006 
Asian  0.059  0.177  0.022  0.053  0.039  0.081 
Texas Resident  0.978  0.989  0.864  0.962  0.985  0.426 
Academic and High 
School 
Characteristics 
           
SAT score / 100  11.867  12.396  8.609  9.995  11.213  12.028 
Top Decile  0.504  0.590  0.065  0.181  0.213  0.330 
High School Class 
Rank 
13.550  10.962  39.451  31.474  27.136  19.402 
Feeder High School  0.183  0.242  0.033  0.086  0.189  0.164 
Private High School  0.079  0.096  0.018  0.073  0.073  0.241 




1998-2004  1998-2003  1998-2005 
N  50214  56483  11477  30160  26516  10783 
Notes:  Out-of-state students as well as students who were considering not considering 
enrollment for the fall semester were dropped.  This was to provide a comparable group of 
students who are considering enrolling at each university.28 
 
Table 2:  Double-Differences for Each of the Universities in Enrollment Yields 
Texas A&M University 
Group 
Fall 1998 - Fall 
2000 




policy by group     Pre – policy  Post – policy 
Non-citizens Texas Residents 
(NCTX)  0.427  0.347  -0.080*** 
 
(0.020)  (0.021)  (0.029) 
Citizens Texas Residents  0.642  0.612  -0.030*** 
(CTX)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Mean difference: NCTX-CTX  -0.215***  -0.265*** 
     (0.020)  (0.022)    
Double Difference        -0.050* 
         (0.029) 
University of Texas at Austin  
Group 
Fall 1998 - Fall 
2000 




policy by group     Pre – policy  Post – policy 
Non-citizens Texas Residents  0.571  0.583  0.012 
(NCTX)  (0.043)  (0.030)  (0.052) 
Citizens Texas Residents  0.611  0.621  0.010** 
(CTX)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Mean difference: NCTX-CTX  -0.040  -0.038 
     (0.042)  (0.029)    
Double Difference        0.002 
         (0.051) 
University of Texas Pan American 
Group 
Fall 1998 - Fall 
2000 




policy by group     Pre – policy  Post – policy 
Non-citizens Texas Residents  0.132  0.304  0.172*** 
(NCTX)  (0.028)  (0.039)  (0.047) 
Citizens Texas Residents  0.423  0.477  0.054*** 
(CTX)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Mean difference: NCTX-CTX  -0.291***  -0.173*** 
     (0.040)  (0.043)    
Double Difference        0.118** 




University of Texas at San Antonio 
Group 
Fall 1998 - Fall 
2000 




policy by group     Pre – policy  Post – policy 
Non-citizens Texas Residents  0.474  0.427  -0.047 
(NCTX)  (0.029)  (0.016)  (0.033) 
Citizens Texas Residents  0.583  0.532  -0.051*** 
(CTX)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Mean difference: NCTX-CTX  -0.109***  -0.105*** 
     (0.029)  (0.017)    
Double Difference        0.004 
         (0.034) 
Texas Tech University 
Group 
Fall 1998 - Fall 
2000 




policy by group     Pre – policy  Post – policy 
Non-citizens Texas Residents  0.416  0.331  -0.085* 
(NCTX)  (0.042)  (0.028)  (0.050) 
Citizens Texas Residents  0.482  0.446  -0.036*** 
(CTX)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Mean difference: NCTX-CTX  -0.066  -0.115*** 
     (0.043)  (0.030)    
Double Difference        -0.049 
         (0.052) 
Southern Methodist University 
Group 
Fall 1998 - Fall 
2000 




policy by group     Pre – policy  Post – policy 
Non-citizens Texas Residents  0.612  0.323  -0.289*** 
(NCTX)  (0.060)  (0.049)  (0.077) 
Citizens Texas Residents  0.413  0.360  -0.053*** 
(CTX)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.010) 
Mean difference: NCTX-CTX  0.199***  -0.037 
     (0.061)  (0.050)    
Double Difference        -0.236*** 




Table 3: OLS - Does lowering tuition increase enrollment yields?  
  Texas 
A&M 







Non-citizen  -0.018  0.414***  0.141***  -0.001  0.016  0.142** 
  (0.020)  (0.050)  (0.034)  (0.027)  (0.059)  (0.060) 
Policy  -0.025***  0.023***  -0.006  -0.062***  -0.027***  -0.048*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.014) 
Non-citizen*Policy  0.021  -0.001  0.183***  0.052*  -0.044  -0.179** 
  (0.028)  (0.052)  (0.045)  (0.031)  (0.056)  (0.077) 
Male  0.010**  0.034***  0.018**  0.030***  0.020***  0.053*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
Black  -0.226***  -0.125***  -0.056**  -0.059***  -0.140***  0.039** 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.020) 
Hispanic  -0.164***  -0.078***  0.054***  -0.047***  -0.149***  -0.001 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
American Indian  -0.064**  -0.015  0.058  0.022  -0.013  0.061 
  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.060)  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.060) 
Asian  -0.237***  0.053***  -0.012  -0.01  -0.146***  0.043** 
  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.017) 
SAT/100  -0.047***  -0.041***  -0.008***  0.024***  -0.026***  -0.052*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Top Decile  0.027***  -0.031***  -0.03  -0.072***  0.048***  0.029* 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.020)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.015) 
Class Rank  0.003***  0.003***  0  0.002***  0.003***  0.004*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Missing Rank  -0.029***  -0.052***  -0.495***  -0.036***  -0.029  -0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.081)  (0.014) 
Texas Resident  0.446***  0.463***  0.531***  0.301***  0.012  -0.073*** 
  (0.011)  (0.026)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.066)  (0.013) 
Feeder High School  -0.025***  0.001  -0.067***  -0.060***  -0.135***  -0.070*** 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.013) 
Private High School  -0.063***  -0.126***  0.095***  -0.040***  -0.181***  -0.034** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.021)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
Constant  0.756***  0.648***  0.157***  0.037  0.723***  0.971*** 
  (0.023)  (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.072)  (0.049) 
N  50214  56483  11477  30160  26516  10783 
R-squared  0.071  0.037  0.331  0.037  0.038  0.058 
Number of Predictions 













Notes:  Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.  * denotes significance at 10%, ** 
denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1% 31 
 
Table 4:  Probit: Average Marginal Effects of the Double Difference 








Texas Tech  SMU 
Interaction  0.0003  -0.0115  0.1369  0.0564  -0.0692  -0.0520 
Standard error  0.0306  0.0272  0.0577  0.0328  0.0923  0.0576 
z-statistic  0.0111  -0.5223  2.2996  1.7218  -0.7495  -0.9032 
N  50214  56483  30160  11477  26516  10783 
 
 
Table 5: Average Characteristics for Hispanic Subsample 
 








Texas Tech  SMU 
Enroll = 1  0.526  0.582  0.501  0.509  0.357  0.408 
Policy variables             
Non-citizen  0.043  0.000  0.012  0.038  0.030  0.032 
Policy  0.429  0.514  0.482  0.686  0.620  0.734 
Non-citizen * 
policy 
0.021  0.000  0.005  0.028  0.021  0.012 
Demographic 
Characteristics 
           
Male  0.479  0.460  0.441  0.423  0.545  0.389 
Academic 
Characteristics 
           
SAT/100  11.176  11.413  8.297  9.627  10.644  11.438 
Top Decile  0.580  0.692  0.069  0.233  0.317  0.364 
Class Rank  11.979  9.027  39.712  28.125  23.337  18.975 
Texas Resident  0.965  0.997  0.953  0.964  0.973  0.388 
Feeder High School  0.083  0.085  0.007  0.031  0.089  0.080 
Private High School  0.091  0.086  0.009  0.087  0.084  0.241 
Sample size  5529  8679  8744  14822  3014  1073 32 
 
Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Regression for Hispanic Subsample 
 







Non-citizen  -0.056  0.022  0.062*  0.063  0.14 
   (0.045)  (0.050)  (0.037)  (0.135)  (0.119) 
Policy  0.001  0.003  -0.037***  0.007  0.039 
   (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.050) 
Non-citizen*Policy  -0.003  0.155***  -0.039  -0.203  -0.026 
   (0.062)  (0.058)  (0.044)  (0.129)  (0.168) 
Male  0.002  0.021**  0.037***  0.007  0.016 
   (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.030) 
SAT/100  -0.027***  -0.008**  0.034***  0.003  -0.071*** 
   (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.011) 
Top Decile  -0.004  -0.032  -0.070***  -0.086***  -0.028 
   (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.012)  (0.025)  (0.049) 
Class Rank  0.005***  0  0.002***  0.004***  0.005*** 
   (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Missing Rank  0.009  -0.517***  -0.078***  0.038  -0.078* 
   (0.032)  (0.010)  (0.022)  (0.359)  (0.047) 
Texas Resident  0.436***  0.495***  0.317***  -0.061  -0.086* 
   (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.171)  (0.045) 
Feeder High 
School 
0.056**  -0.184***  0.001  -0.104***  -0.005 
   (0.024)  (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.058) 
Private High 
School 
-0.033  0.021  -0.026*  -0.198***  -0.066* 
   (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.015)  (0.031)  (0.040) 
Constant  0.350***  0.246***  -0.145***  0.335*  1.155*** 
   (0.061)  (0.035)  (0.040)  (0.188)  (0.139) 
N  5529  8744  14822  3014  1073 
R-squared  0.046  0.282  0.038  0.047  0.077 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.  * denotes significance at 10%, ** 
denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1% 
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interaction  -0.008  0.189  -0.040  -0.196  -0.018 
standard error  0.067  0.124  0.047  0.111  0.170 
z-statistic  -0.122  1.564  -0.854  -1.764  -0.109 
N  5529  8744  14822  3014  1073 
 